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CLIMATE CHANGE HAS BEEF WITH FEDERAL
CATTLE GRAZING
John David Janicek
11 WASH. J. ENV T. L. & POL Y 349 (2021)
ABSTRACT
Increased emissions of greenhouse gases are causing the Earth s
climate to change producing extreme temperatures and dangerous
conditions for mankind. Livestock is positioned at a unique juncture of
the current and future fight against atmospheric temperature rise. These
animals produce the very nutrients a growing world population needs to
survive, and the meat they yield plays an important role in all world
cultures. Unfortunately, the production of livestock is considered one of
the most significant emitters of greenhouse gases, of which cattle is the
largest contributor. Therefore, a balance must be struck between
livestock production and preservation of the Earth. One way to rebalance
this relationship would be to reform the federal cattle grazing permit
system.
Federal land in the Western United States contains hundreds of
millions of acres and makes up over half the landmass of some states.
The Bureau of Land Management and Forestry Service oversee most of
the federal land in the West. On this land, these agencies operate grazing
*
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Law and earned a Bachelor of Arts degree from Texas A&M University. He works at the
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programs in which they allow private ranchers to apply for permits to
graze cattle on the lands for a fee. The fee is based on an archaic formula
that has not been updated in decades and is based on outdated economics
of cattle grazing. As a result, the permit fee is far below market value,
and the government operates the cattle grazing programs at a deficit of
tens of millions of dollars annually.
The subsidizing of cattle grazing on land owned by the American
people, which directly exacerbates climate change, is wrong. Action
should be taken to redress the impacts on the climate and the costs to the
federal government. Modernizing the permit fee can be accomplished by
a two-fold change. First, the minimum rate has to be raised to make
certain the government is at least getting close to a fair price. This
avenue was pursued but ultimately not accomplished in the Obama
Administration. Second, the permits should be auctioned to the public for
a price in excess of the minimum rate, and the permit length shortened to
allow more frequent fee adjustment through auctions. Additionally, the
increased revenue resulting from these changes should be allocated to
efforts to mitigate cattle production s effect on climate change.
INTRODUCTION
Few can be cattlemen, 1 is certainly a true statement, but the effects
of cattle impact us all. Increasing emissions of greenhouse gases are
causing the Earth s climate to change, producing e treme temperatures
and dangerous conditions for mankind. Livestock sit at a unique juncture
of the current and future fight against atmospheric temperature rise.
These animals produce the very nutrients a growing world population
needs to survive, and they often hold significant roles in various
cultures.2 Unfortunately, cattle in particular emit dangerous greenhouse
gases3 that will need to be curbed to slow global warming and its perilous
effects.
1

Proud Cattle Men (@proudcattlemen), INSTAGRAM,
https://www.instagram.com/proudcattlemen/ (last visited Nov. 2, 2020).
2 Atli Arnarson, Beef 101: Nutrition Facts and Health Effects, HEALTHLINE (Apr. 4,
2019),
https://www.healthline.com/nutrition/foods/beef#:~:text=Red%20Meat%20Is%20Very%
20Nutritious&text=Vitamin%20B3%20(niacin)%3A%2025,better%20than%20iron%20f
rom%20plants); Kimberly Winston, The Splainer: Wha Make he Co Sacred o
Hindus?, WASH. POST (Nov. 5, 2015),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/religion/the-splainer-what-makes-the-cowsacred-to-hindus/2015/11/05/acdde3e2-840c-11e5-8bd2-680fff868306_story.html.
3
Veerasamy Sejian et al., Global Warming: Role of Livestock, in CLIMATE CHANGE
IMPACT ON LIVESTOCK: ADAPTATION AND M ITIGATION 141, 151 (Veerasamy Sejian et al.
350
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People often look at the vastness of the American West and wonder,
who owns all this land? Generall , the answer is the federal
government, and thus the American people. To benefit food production,
utilize natural resources, and provide employment, the federal
government allows private citizens to graze cattle on much of this land
by granting grazing permits.4 These permits typically allot ranchers a
certain number of cattle to graze on specific plots of federal land in
exchange for a fee paid to the government.5 This is a fair enough
premise. But the government has run the program at a loss of tens of
millions of dollars for decades.6 Running the program at a loss would
potentially be acceptable under different circumstances, but when this
same cattle production contributes to the heating of the planet and
destruction of federal land, it must be improved.
The federal government must stop running its grazing program at a
huge financial loss by increasing the base fee to graze the land. In
addition, when grazing permits reach their renewal stage, they should be
put up for auction on the open market so they can be sold for a rate
reflecting their value. The money received in excess of the base permit
fee would then go to an Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) fund
that partners with the private sector to reduce greenhouse gas emissions.
This paper will begin with a brief discussion of livestock s particular
impact on global warming. Next, it will describe the development of
federal regulations for cattle grazing on public lands and the current
regulatory scheme. The paper will then explain why the current
regulations, specifically the PRIA formula, are failing miserably. It will
propose a relatively straight-forward solution, the B.E.E.F. system,
which addresses both the fee receipts deficit and the impact of cattle
grazing on climate change. The paper labels this solution the Bettering
Environments and Economies Fund (B.E.E.F.) system. Lastly, there will
be a discussion of potential issues and arguments against the B.E.E.F.
system.
I.

IMPACT OF CATTLE ON CLIMATE CHANGE

The scientific community is nearly unanimous in the viewpoint that
the Earth s atmosphere is warming, causing a m riad of negative impacts

eds., 2015); M. Melissa Rojas-Downing et al., Climate Change and Livestock: Impacts,
Adaptation, and Mitigation, 16 CLIMATE RISK MGMT. 145, 152 (2017).
4 See infra Section III.
5
See infra Section III.B.1.
6 See infra Section IV.B.
351
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to society.7 The scientific community also agrees that human behavior is
contributing to rising temperatures through the emission of greenhouse
gases (GHGs) and other actions like deforestation.8 Since the year 1750,
human activity has increased atmospheric levels of the GHGs carbon
dioxide (CO2), methane (CH4), and nitrous oxide (N2O).9 From 18802012, on average, the land and ocean surface temperatures have risen
0.85 degrees Celsius.10 In fact, climate models suggest global surface
temperatures are already 0.5 degrees Celsius (0.9 degrees Fahrenheit)
warmer than the 1986-2005 average global surface temperature,
indicating an exponential rate of warming.11 It is e tremel likel that
more than half of the observed increase in global average surface
temperature from 1951 to 2010 was caused by the anthropogenic
increase in greenhouse gas concentrations and other anthropogenic
forcings together. 12 An increase of 2 degrees Celsius above preindustrial average global temperature is the customary marker (though
partially politically calculated) of when the impacts of climate change
will be disastrous.13 These disastrous results include: increased weather
related mortality; extreme floods, droughts, and wildfires; increased
human displacement and poverty; food production difficulties; and
ecosystem failures.14
The global raising of livestock is a significant factor in the emission
of greenhouse gases and contributes more GHG emissions than the entire
transportation industry.15 A major stud b the United Nations Food and
7

Scientific Consensus: Earth's Climate is Warming, NASA,
https://climate.nasa.gov/scientific-consensus/ (last visited May 12, 2021).
8
Id.
9
Thomas Stocker et al., Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Summary for
Policy Makers, in CLIMATE CHANGE 2013: THE PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS 3, 11 (Thomas
Stocker et al. eds., 2013).
10
Id. at 5.
11
Rebecca Lindsey & LuAnn Dahlman, Climate Change: Global Temperature, NAT L
OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN. (Mar. 15, 2021), https://www.climate.gov/newsfeatures/understanding-climate/climate-change-globaltemperature#:~:text=By%202020%2C%20modelm%20project%20that,emissions%20pat
hway%20tth%20world%20follows.
12 Stocker, supra note 9, at 17.
13
Why 2 Degrees Celsius Is Climate Change Magic N mber, PBS (Dec. 2, 2015),
https://www.pbs.org/newshour/show/why-2-degrees-celsius-is-climate-changes-magicnumber (Additionally, the 2 degrees Celsius number was chosen by political bodies as a
number that would be convenient to enable collective action. Though it matches up with
some estimations of the appropriate goal, the number is not solely science based.)
14
Christopher B. Field et al., Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Summary for
Policymakers, in CLIMATE CHANGE 2014: IMPACTS, ADAPTATION AND VULNERABILITY 1,
6-7 (Christopher Field et al eds., 2014).
15 Rojas-Downing et al., supra note 3, at 152.
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Agriculture Organization (FAO) concluded that livestock production is
one of the top two or three most significant contributors to the most
serious environmental problems, at ever scale from to local to global,
and it is a major stressor on man ecos stems and the planet as a
whole. 16 Livestock production accounts for about 14.5% of total
greenhouse gas emissions.17 Methane and nitrous oxide are the two most
significant greenhouse gases released from livestock production.18
Methane s effect on global temperature rise is 28 times that of CO2.
Nitrous oxide is even more potent as its effect on global temperature rise
is 265 times that of CO2.19 Emissions from livestock constitute 44% of
the global anthropogenic emissions of methane and 53% of the emissions
of nitrous oxide.20 Livestock GHG emissions come from enteric
fermentation (the digestive process of breaking down the plant s
biomass), respiration, excretions, manure application, production of feed
crops, and processing of products.21 The United States is responsible for
the fourth largest amount of methane emissions globally.22
Cattle is responsible for a majority of global livestock GHG
emission, contributing 65% of the sector s emissions.23 Cattle raised for
beef specificall are responsible for 45% of the entire livestock sector s
GHG emissions.24 A majority of these emissions come from enteric
fermentation.25 The gaseous waste from this process is mainly removed
from the body through eructation.26 Of all livestock, beef production
releases the highest emission rate per unit of product, at 300 CO2

16

Debra L. Donahue, Trampling the Public Trust, 37 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 257, 293
(2010).
17 Giampiero Grossi et al., Livestock and Climate Change: Impact of Livestock on
Climate and Mitigation Strategies, 9 ANIMAL FRONTIERS 69, 69 (2019).
18
Id.
19 Id.
20
Rojas-Downing et al., supra note 3, at 151.
21
Id. at 152.
22
Id. at 154.
23
Key Facts and Findings, FOOD AND AGRIC. ORG. OF THE UNITED NATIONS,
http://www.fao.org/news/story/en/item/197623/icode/ (last visited Nov. 3, 2020).
24
Grossi et al., supra note 17, at 70.
25 Higher quality forage results in lower methane emissions because it is more easily
digestible. Id.
26 Id.
353
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equivalents27 per kilogram of protein produced.28 Meanwhile, chicken
and pork products produce less than 100 CO2 equivalents per kilogram.29
In addition to cattle s impact on climate change, global warming will
have an impact on cattle. A decrease in natural water in these regions, an
expected result of climate change, will result in a decrease in forage,
further straining the land.30 Even the plants that are able to grow will
have increased lignin and cell wall components which will reduce the
digestibility and decrease nutrient availability for cattle.31 Other expected
impacts of global warming on cattle include increased water demands,
decreases in body mass, decreased reproduction rates, and higher
mortality rates.32
While demand for livestock products is expected to increase 100%
by midcentury, climate change will affect competition for natural
resources, biodiversity loss, heat stress, and quality of feed and forage.33
The focus of this paper is on direct GHG emissions, but livestock also
have other negative impacts on the environment like land use change and
degradation, air and water pollution, and biodiversity destruction.34
Experts agree that any comprehensive solution to climate change must
address livestock production.35
II.

FEDERAL CATTLE GRAZING REGULATORY STRUCTURE

Federal regulation of cattle grazing in the West covers sixteen states:
Arizona, California, Colorado, Idaho, Kansas, Montana, Nebraska, New
Mexico, Nevada, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Dakota, Utah,
27

A carbon dio ide equivalent or CO2 equivalent, abbreviated as CO2-eq is a metric
measure used to compare the emissions from various greenhouse gases on the basis of
their global-warming potential (GWP), by converting amounts of other gases to the
equivalent amount of carbon dio ide with the same global warming potential. Glossary:
Carbon Dioxide Equivalent, EUROSTAT STATISTICS EXPLAINED (Mar. 9, 2017),
https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statisticsexplained/index.php?title=Glossary:Carbon_dioxide_equivalent#:~:text=A%20carbon%2
0dioxide%20equivalent%20or,with%20the%20same%20global%20warming.
28
Key Facts and Findings, supra note 23.
29 Id.
30
Hillary M. Hoffmann, Demand Management, Climate Change, and the Livestock
Grazing Crisis in the Great Basin, 6. GEO. WASH. J. ENERGY & ENVTL. L. 14, 21 (2016).
31
Rojas-Downing et al., supra note 3, at 147.
32
Id.
33 Id. at 146.
34
Id. at 151.
35 Donahue, supra note 16, at 260 (citing U.N. Found. & Sigma Xi, Confronting Climate
Change: Avoiding the Unmanageable and Managing the Unavoidable 95 AM. SCIENTIST
1, 69-70 (2007)).
354
Published by UW Law Digital Commons, 2021

7

Washington Journal of Environmental Law & Policy, Vol. 11, Iss. 3 [2021], Art. 7

Washington Journal of Environmental Law and Policy

Washington, and Wyoming.36 Federal lands make up a large portion of
many of these states. On the extreme end in Nevada, federal land exceeds
80% of the entire land in the state.37 Other states that are largely
comprised of federal land include Utah (63.1%), Idaho (61.9%), Oregon
(52.3%), and Wyoming (46.7%).38
A.

Statutory Provisions

1. Before regulation
Cattle grazing on federal land has not always been regulated. The
industry grew immediately following the Civil War, but it mostly
consisted of nomadic herders moving unrestricted across the land.39 In
1862, Congress passed the Homestead Act which opened federal land to
ownership by anyone who settled and cultivated it.40 This and other laws
distributing federal lands increased competition for public land, and
ranchers began fencing off the areas of public land on which they
generally grazed.41 Tensions reached their peak in the 1880s and 1890s
with range wars between cattle and sheep ranchers.42 The first attempt
by Congress at addressing range problems was the Unlawful Inclosures
Act of 1885.43 This Act prohibited the fencing off of public lands to limit
private claims for public land made without color of title.44 However, the
law s impact on conflicts between ranchers was minimal because it did
not address the underlying issue; there was not enough water and forage
for the quantity of grazing livestock.45 By 1897, the federal government
had recognized grazing as a legitimate use of Western federal lands.46 In
1905, the Forest Service (FS) established a public policy for National
Forests to allow grazing so long as it did not negatively impact forest
36

CHRISTINE GLASER, CHUCK ROMANIELLO & KARYN MOSKOWITZ, COST AND
CONSEQUENCES: THE REAL PRICE OF LIVESTOCK GRAZING ON AMERICA S PUBLIC LANDS 9
(2015) [hereinafter GLASER ].
37 CONG. RSCH. SERV., R42346, FEDERAL LAND O WNERSHIP: OVERVIEW AND DATA 8
(2020).
38
Id. at 7-8.
39 GLASER, supra note 36, at 7.
40
Hoffmann, supra note 30, at 19.
41
GLASER, supra note 36, at 7.
42
Hoffmann, supra note 30, at 20.
43
Id.
44 Id.
45
Id.
46 Why Does the Forest Service Permit Livestock Grazing on National Forest System
Lands?, U.S. FOREST SERV., https://www.fs.fed.us/rangelandmanagement/grazing/allowgrazing.shtml (last visited May 11, 2021).
355
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conservation.47 This regulation had limited impact and overuse continued
to deteriorate the land.48
2. Taylor Land Grazing Act
The first major effort at sweeping regulation to curb the destruction
of Western lands was the Taylor Grazing Act of 1934.49 The stated goal
of this law was to stop injur to the public gra ing lands b preventing
overgrazing and soil deterioration, to provide for their orderly use,
improvement, and development, to stabilize the livestock industry
dependent upon the public range, and for other purposes. 50 The Act
gave the Secretary of the Interior the responsibility to regulate cattle
grazing on 80 million acres of unreserved federal land.51 The Secretary
was to organize grazing districts and issue permits to ranchers.52 It
created a preference that the permits be granted to persons within or
near the gra ing district, and it set the permit duration at 10 ears.53 The
Act allowed for ranchers to make alterations to their permitted lands that
were necessary for grazing livestock.54 It also provided for 25% of the
fee to be used b the Secretar for the construction, purchase, or
maintenance of range improvements and for 50% of the fee to be given
to the State in which the district was located.55
This Act had its desired impact: implementation of the Act resulted
in overall livestock reduction and elimination of nomadic herds.56 It also
set in place the tenets that still make up the backbone of current
regulations. In 1946, the Grazing Service (the division of the Interior
handling grazing responsibilities) merged with the General Land Office
to form the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) within the Department
of the Interior.57

47

Id.
GLASER, supra note 36, at 7.
49
See Taylor Grazing Act, THE LIVING NEW DEAL,
https://livingnewdeal.org/glossary/taylor-grazing-act-1935/ (last visited May 11, 2021).
50
Taylor Grazing Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-482, 48 Stat. 1269, 1269 (1934) (prior to
1936 amendment).
51
Id.
52
Id. at 1270.
53 Id. at 1271.
54
Id.
55 Id. at 1273.
56
GLASER, supra note 36, at 7.
57 Id.
48
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3. Granger-Thye Act and the Federal Land Policy and
Management Act (FLPMA)
The Granger-Thye Act of 1950 brought the Forest Service cattle
grazing regulations in line with BLM regulations by creating a similar
grazing permit and fee structure. It also authorized land improvement
from funds generated by grazing fees and set permit durations at a
maximum of ten years.58
The Federal Land Policy and Management Act became law in 1976
and governs how the BLM manages its lands. The Act requires that the
public lands be managed in a manner that will protect the quality of
scientific, scenic, historical, ecological, environmental, air and
atmospheric, water resource, and archeological values; that, where
appropriate, will preserve and protect certain public lands in their natural
condition. 59 Moreover, the Act requires the Secretary of Agriculture and
the Secretary of the Interior establish a fee for the grazing permits under
their control that is equitable to the rancher and the United States.60 Of
that fee, 50% is used for range rehabilitation, protection, and
improvements because the federal lands were deteriorating in
qualit . 61 Of that 50%, half is put into projects taking place where the
money was derived and the other half is distributed to other projects
determined by the relevant Secretary.62 Importantly, the law also grants
priority of renewal to the rancher currently holding the permit if they and
the land are in good standing.63 This is still the law the BLM operates
under in 2021.
4. Public Rangelands Improvement Act (PRIA)
Another significant law impacting federal cattle grazing permits
today is the Public Rangelands Improvement Act of 1978 (PRIA). In
enacting PRIA, Congress recogni ed that vast segments of public
rangelands are
in an unsatisfactor condition. 64 The government
determined that overgra ing ma ultimatel lead to unpredictable and
undesirable long-term local and regional climatic and economic
58

Laws, Regulations, and Policies, U.S. FOREST SERV., https://www.fs.fed.us/rangelandmanagement/aboutus/lawsregs.shtml (last visited May 11, 2021).
59
43 U.S.C. § 1701(a)(8).
60 43 U.S.C. § 1751(b).
61
43 U.S.C. § 1751(b).
62 Id.
63
43 U.S.C. § 1752(c).
64 Hoffmann, supra note 30, at 21.
357
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changes. 65 One way PRIA addressed the overgrazing was making
changes in management policies to resolve conflicting legal demands on
ranchers and improve cooperation among the relevant government
agencies.66 The most important aspect of PRIA, for the purposes of this
paper, was the establishment of a formula that automatically set grazing
fees for the lands managed by the BLM and FS. The fee is calculated to
determine the economic value of the land to the rancher, and will be
discussed in greater detail in the following section. The calculation
determined the grazing fee should be $1.23 per AUM67 for the years
1979-1985.68 The calculation did not provide for regional variation; all
the regulated land in the 16 states covered by PRIA would operate under
the same permit fee. The fee was not allowed to increase by more than
25% from the previous year.69
When the trial period of the PRIA formula ended, President Ronald
Reagan signed Executive Order 12548.70 The Order made the PRIA
formula the permanent method for calculating the grazing permit fee but,
importantly, set a minimum fee of $1.35 despite any calculation results
below that total.71 It also kept the cap of a 25% annual fee increase.72
This is the current system that determines BLM and FS grazing fees.
5. National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA)
In 1970, the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) was
enacted to to promote efforts which will prevent or eliminate damage to
the environment and biosphere and stimulate the health and welfare of
man. 73 It requires government agencies to consider the environmental
impacts of their proposed actions that significantly affect[] the quality
of the human environment. 74 NEPA is significant to federal regulation
of cattle grazing because the issuance of a federal grazing permit
generally triggers the NEPA process.75

65

Id.
Jimmy Carter, Public Rangelands Improvement Act of 1978 - Statement on Signing
H.R. 10587 into Law - October 27, 1978, 1978 Pub. Paper 1875 (1978).
67
See infra Section B.1. (explaining the standardized unit).
68
43 U.S.C. § 1905.
69
Id.
70
Exec. Order No. 12548, 3 C.F.R. 188 (1986).
71 GLASER, supra note 36, at 8.
72
Id.
73 42 U.S.C. § 4321.
74
42 U.S.C. § 4332(C).
75 GLASER, supra note 36, at 7.
66
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NEPA imposes what man ranchers consider an onerous process
that requires a good deal of time and effort.76 At a minimum, to have
their permit renewed, ranchers will generally have to create a document
called an Environmental Assessment (EA).77 If their conduct will clearly
have significant impacts on the environment, the rancher will be
required to engage in the more complex Environmental Impact Statement
(EIS) process.78 The EA process requires the applicant to consider and
report [p]erceived environmental consequences of proposed actions and
a range of alternatives. 79 It typically begins with a Proposed Action
document produced by the rancher.80 This document begins with the
gra ing histor and
management of the last ten ears. 81 The
applicant and agency (FS or BLM) will also gather data to identify the
improvements or needs of the land and the corresponding desired
conditions.82 Then the relevant government agency will prepare the EA.83
Next, the applicant will work with the agency on issue identification
and scoping. Scoping is the process of receiving public commentary on
the proposed plan and is required for all FS applications.84 For the BLM,
only major proposed actions require public scoping.85 During scoping,
the agency circulates documents from the applicant that include: a
recitation of issues of concern; description of the allotment; past project
successes and failures; mitigating factors; monitoring data; goals;
environmental impacts, and more.86 Based on resulting comments, the
applicant will help develop alternative plans with less environmental
impact and analyze the effects of the new plans, though they are not
required to adopt the alternatives.87
Finally, the agency will issue a Decision Notice (for the FS) or a
Decision Record (for BLM) with a determination of a Finding of No
76

Todd Neeley, Proposed NEPA Change Lauded by Ranchers, Progressive Farmer (Jan.
9, 2020), https://www.dtnpf.com/agriculture/web/ag/news/worldpolicy/article/2020/01/09/trump-proposal-said-speed-approval.
77
National Environmental Policy Act Review Process, EPA (Sept. 17, 2020),
https://www.epa.gov/nepa/national-environmental-policy-act-review-process.
78 See id.
79
JIM SPRINKLE ET AL., NEPA FOR RANCHERS 1,
https://extension.arizona.edu/sites/extension.arizona.edu/files/attachment/gila-nepa-forranchers.pdf (last visited May 12, 2021).
80
Id. at 19.
81
Id. at 2.
82
Id. at 2-3.
83 Id.
84
Id. at 5.
85 Id. Scoping is required for all FS proposed actions including EAs. Id.
86
Id. at 5-6.
87 See id.
359
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Significant Impact if the agenc finds that the permit will have no
significant impact on the environment.88 A finding that the permit will
have a significant impact requires undergoing the Environmental
Impact Statement process.89 After the conclusion of one of these
processes, the permit applicant can implement the planned actions but
the still need to monitor their actions because mistakes, new
information, changed conditions, or unanticipated effects ma require
alteration of the plan.90 In 2020, the Trump Administration shortened the
NEPA review length as it applies to federal cattle grazing.91 Ranchers
have long felt such a complex system is not appropriate for their conduct
and this adjustment is unlikely to change their outlook.92
B.

Federal Management

1. Bureau of Land Management and Forestry Service
The Forest Service, under the Secretary of Agriculture, and the
Bureau of Land Management, under the Secretary of the Interior, are the
primary federal entities responsible for managing the federal grazing
program. The BLM manages 154.1 million acres of land that is available
for cattle grazing.93 Most of the BLM s land consists of arid and semiarid land that was not claimed during the disposition of most Western
land through the Homestead Act and related laws.94 The FS manages an
additional 93 million acres of cattle grazing lands95 on U.S. forestlands
and National Grasslands. The FS organizes its data based on geographic
regions, the largest of which is the Intermountain Region (Nevada, Utah
and Idaho) containing 24,107,000 acres of federal grazing land.96 BLM

88

Id. at 12.
Id.
90 Id.
91 Jeff Brady, Trump Overhauls Key Environmental Law to Speed Up Pipelines and
Other Projects, NPR (July 15, 2020), https://www.npr.org/2020/07/15/891190100/trumpoverhauls-key-environmental-law-to-speed-up-pipelines-and-other-projects.
92
See Carol Ryan Dumas, Ranchers Welcome NEPA Modernization, CAP. PRESS (Jan. 15,
2020), https://www.capitalpress.com/ag_sectors/livestock/ranchers-welcome-nepamodernization/article_97d55592-37b4-11ea-b008-6fdaeb808287.html.
93
CAROL HARDY VINCENT, CONG. RSCH. SERV., RS21232, GRAZING FEES: OVERVIEW AND
ISSUES 1 (2019) [hereinafter GRAZING FEES].
94
Brian L. Frank, Cows in Hot Water: Regulation of Livestock Grazing Through the
Federal Clean Water Act, 35 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1269, 1278 (1995).
95
GRAZING FEES, supra note 93, at 1.
96 GLASER, supra note 36, at 9-11.
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and FS lands are also generally available for purposes other than grazing
because both agencies are multiple-use agencies.97
The permitting systems of the FS and the BLM are similar. Both
agencies divide their lands into allotments of widely varying sizes. 98 The
BLM requires permit applicants to own or control a base property that is
capable of serving as a base of operation for livestock use of public
lands within a gra ing district. 99 The FS generally requires base
property as well.100 Permits are generally for a duration of ten years with
non-competitive renewal.101 The permit holder does not obtain title to the
land they are grazing.102
Permits are issued for a certain number of cattle determined by the
particular allotment s Animal Unit Month (AUM) capacity. An AUM is
a standardi ed unit of measurement of the amount of forage necessar
for the complete sustenance of one animal unit for a period of 1
month. 103 In practice, one AUM means the use of public lands b one
cow and her calf, one horse, or five sheep or goats for a month. 104 So
one hundred acres of lush ranching land will have a higher AUM number
permitted than one hundred barren acres.105
The BLM issued 17,886 grazing permits and leases in 2017 which
resulted in 8,820,617 AUMs grazing that year.106 From 2002-2013, the
BLM averaged 8,359,496 AUMs grazing its land.107 The four states with
the most BLM grazing lands are Nevada (39,331,000 acres), Utah
(19,321,000 acres), Wyoming (15,917,000 acres), and New Mexico
(11,533,000).108

97

Id. at 6; see BLM
M l iple U e Manda e
What Does That Even Mean?, Bureau
of Land Mgmt. (Mar. 9, 2016),
https://www.blm.gov/or/districts/burns/newsroom/files/multipleuse.pdf.
98 GLASER, supra note 36, at 8.
99
43 C.F.R. § 4110.2-1(a)(1) (2021). Base propert ma also be contiguous land, or,
when no applicant owns or controls contiguous land, noncontiguous land that is capable
of being used in conjunction with a livestock operation which would utilize public lands
outside a gra ing district. Id. § 4110.2-1(a)(2).
100 How Do I Get a Grazing Permit?, U.S. FOREST SERV.,
https://www.fs.fed.us/rangeland-management/grazing/permits.shtml (last visited Nov. 3,
2020).
101
GLASER, supra note 36, at 8.
102
Id.
103
Id. at 8 n.2.
104
Id.
105 The land area needed to produce an AUM will differ considerabl depending on soil
productivit and precipitation. Id. at 12.
106 GRAZING FEES, supra note 93, at 1.
107
GLASER, supra note 36, at 12.
108 Id. at 36 (numbers based on 2004 data).
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In 2017, the FS had 6,146 active permits and 6,803,425 AUMs
grazing.109 The average number of AUMs grazing FS land from 20022013 was 6,335,542.110 Together with BLM AUMs, the two agencies
managed over 15.6 million AUMs grazing on federal lands in 2017.111
Other federal agencies also manage grazing lands, for example the
National Park Service, the Department of Defense, and the U.S. Fish and
Wildlife Service.112 Altogether these agencies manage less than five
million acres with less than one million AUMs.113 Because the impact
these agencies have on national meat and greenhouse gas production is
relatively insignificant, they are not covered in detail in this paper.
The BLM and FS vary in how they distribute the revenue from the
permit fee. Both put the greater of 50% of fee revenue or $10 million
into a Range Betterment Fund (RBF)114 in the Treasury.115 The grazing
fees are deposited separately and are subject to appropriations.116 The
RBF is used for rehabilitation and improvement projects like fence
construction, weed control, reseeding, and water development.117 But, the
other 50% is where the two agencies vary. The FS gives the Treasury the
remaining 50%, half of which the Treasury retains for itself and half of
which is distributed to the states under a revenue-sharing agreement
which is ultimately passed to local governments.118 On the other hand,
the BLM only returns 12.5% of the collected fee to the states for lands
within grazing districts; the remaining amount goes to the US
Treasury.119 When the land is outside of a grazing district, the BLM gives
the states 50% of the collected fee.120
The permits issued by the agencies set out terms and conditions for
use of the land such as the time period in which grazing is acceptable.121
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GRAZING FEES, supra note 93, at 2.
GLASER, supra note 36, at 14.
111
GRAZING FEES, supra note 93, at 1-2.
112
GLASER, supra note 36, at 12.
113 U.S. GOV T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-05-869, LIVESTOCK GRAZING: FEDERAL
EXPENDITURES AND RECEIPTS VARY, DEPENDING ON THE AGENCY AND THE PURPOSE OF
THE FEE CHARGED 17 tbl.2 (2005), available at http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-05869.
114
Referred to as a Range Improvement Fund by the BLM and Range Betterment Fund
by Forest Service.
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GRAZING FEES, supra note 93, at 4.
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Id. at 5.
119 Id.
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121 GLASER, supra note 36, at 12.
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III.

FAILURES OF THE CURRENT REGULATORY SCHEME
A.

An Archaic Formula

As discussed above, the permit fee per AUM that applies to BLM
and FS land is set according to the calculation of the PRIA formula.122
Before this formula became law, the BLM and the FS tried to charge fees
that would either cover their costs for operating the program or were
market-based.123 The introduction of the PRIA formula was not intended
to be a shift away from the goal of recovering costs associated with
operating the programs. The PRIA formula was intended to reflect[]
annual changes in the costs of production and the economic value of the
land.124 It may have succeeded in serving that purpose at one point in its
54 year existence, but it does not anymore.125
The PRIA fee is determined b three factors based on costs in
western states of (1) the rental charge for pasturing cattle on private
rangelands [FVI], (2) the sales price of beef cattle [BCPI], and (3) the
cost of livestock production [PPI]. 126 The formula is as follows:127

The base year fee for forage in 1966 was $1.23, which was
determined by the cost difference of cattle production on private versus
public lands for that year, not including grazing fees.128 Forage Value
Index (FVI) is based on private rates for cattle grazing on non-irrigated
land in the West as published b the USDA s National Agricultural
Statistics Service (NASS).129
Before 1973, FVI was often the sole consideration in determining
grazing fees.130 But that ear the American National Cattleman s
Association proposed a new formula that would take into account
122

See supra Section II.A.4. The FS Grasslands use a different, but similar formula that
results in a similar number to the PRIA formula. See 36 C.F.R. § 222.51 (2021).
123 GLASER, supra note 36, at 19-20.
124
43 U.S.C. §§ 1901(a)(5), 1905.
125
U.S. GOV T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 113, at 50-51.
126
CAROL HARDY VINCENT, CONG. RSCH. SERV., RS21232, GRAZING FEES: OVERVIEW
AND ISSUES 3 (2012).
127 GLASER, supra note 36, at 22.
128
Id.
129 Id. at 23.
130
L. ALLEN TORELL ET AL., AN EVALUATION OF THE PRIA GRAZING FEE FORMULA, 3
tbl.1 (2001), available at https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/6551231.pdf.
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ranchers abilit to pa fees.131 This innovation was the first introduction
of the Beef Cattle Price Index (BCPI) and the Prices Paid Index (PPI). 132
The BCPI is determined by calculating the weighted average of the
annual beef sales price in the West the prior year.133 The PPI is based on
various categories of livestock production costs as published by the
USDA s NASS.134
The addition of PPI and BCPI to the PRIA formula did not make it
more accurately reflect annual forage values.135 The problem with PPI is
that it has almost always been a larger number than BCPI. 136 As a result,
a negative BCPI-PPI value is added to FVI. Because FVI is constantly
decreasing naturally, the resulting fee cannot increase at a similar rate to
private fees.137 If the base fee is being multiplied by a rate that is already
below that of the private fee on comparable land, it statistically cannot
keep up. Adding these two components to the fee formula ruined the
predictive abilit of the formula. 138 For example, if the BCPI-PPI
factors had not been added, the fee for the year 2000 would have been
$3.94/AUM.139 Instead, for fee year 2000 the minimum fee of $1.35 was
charged because the formula calculated a $1.12 fee.140 In the extreme,
from fee years 2009-2011 the PRIA formula calculated a negative permit
fee value.141 From 2000-2013, the minimum legal fee was charged in all
but four years.142 For example, in 2013 FVI was 507, BCPI was 548, and
PPI was 994.143 This large PPI value resulted in a $0.75 calculated PRIA
fee.144
For the last 15 years, BLM and FS grazing fees have been lower than
other federal, private, and state grazing fees.145 State grazing fees have
wide variation but stay far above the PRIA fee.146 In 2013, Arizona
charged $2.28/AUM, the lowest Western state fee, while Texas charged

131

Id.
Id.
133
GLASER, supra note 36, at 23.
134 Id.
135 TORELL ET AL., supra note 130, at 4.
136
See GLASER, supra note 36, at 25.
137 Id. at 23.
138
Torell, at 4.
139
Id.
140
GLASER, supra note 36, at 25.
141
Id.
142 See id.
143
Id.
144 Id.
145
GRAZING FEES, supra note 93, at 8.
146 See generally GLASER, supra note 36, at 29.
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the top fee of $65-$150/AUM.147 There is no reason to believe these state
lands are inherently far better for cattle grazing than federal lands in the
same regions.148 For private lands in 2017, the 16 Western states had an
average AUM fee of $23.40.149 Oklahoma had the lowest average at
$11.50/AUM and Nebraska had the highest average at $39.00/AUM.150
Private fees are determined by supply and demand principles with factors
such as quality of forage, water availability, and grazing infrastructure.151
These fees dwarf the fee being charged for cattle to graze on over 95% of
federal lands in the West.152 Additionally, these large variations in fees
from state to state show the irrationality of the BLM and FS charging the
same fee for a permit in every state. The same variables in the land that
impact the value of permits on private lands impact the value of federal
land grazing permits, even if it is not reflected in the permit price.153 For
example, private rates for non-irrigated lands in Colorado range from
$3.72 to $38 per AUM.154
At its inception in 1966, the $1.23 base fee was about one-third of
the private grazing fee.155 When the PRIA formula went into effect, it
was about 24% of the cost of grazing on private lands.156 From 20002012, the highest ratio of federal to private fee was in 2004, when private
fees averaged 12.26% of the cost to graze on federal land.157 The low
during that period was in 2013 when the fee only represented 6.72% of
the private fee.158
If the BCPI-PPI factors had not been added to the PRIA fee
calculation, the grazing fee would be about $6 today, nearly four and a
half times the minimum rate being charged.159 This fee would still be

147

Id. Texas is not in the West and is an outlier with the next highest rate being Nebraska
at up to $39. Id.
148
See infra Section V (rebutting claims that there is an understanding of the superiority
of private land).
149 GRAZING FEES, supra note 93, at 8.
150 Id.
151
GLASER, supra note 36, at 24.
152 See U.S. GOV T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 113, at 16-17 (the federal
grazing lands not regulated by the FS or BLM make up less than 5% of the total).
153
Livestock operator costs are . . . not uniform on BLM and USFS land. GLASER,
supra note 36, at 24.
154
Id. at 27.
155 Id. at 23.
156
Id. at 24.
157 See id. at 25.
158
Id. at 24.
159 See id. at 23.
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approximately a third of the usual private grazing fee, just as it was
intended to be when PRIA was first conceived.160
Other federal agencies with public lands that permit cattle grazing
have different fee structures. In 2004, when PRIA was $1.43, the
National Park Service charged an average of $4.30 and the U.S. Fish and
Wildlife Service had an average fee of $11.24.161 Some agencies use a
competitive bidding process while others set the fee based on the average
prevailing rate for the particular area.162 Even the FS, on FS lands in the
Eastern U.S., uses market-based methods to determine the grazing fee.163
Similarly, six states award permits for state lands to the highest bidder
and another six states determine their fee based on the relevant market
prices.164
B.

Federal Subsidy for Private Grazing

[I]t is generall recogni ed that [] the federal government does not
receive a market price for its permits. 165 While not receiving a full
return of value on the program expenditures may occasionally be
acceptable to taxpayers, the federal government loses tens of millions of
dollars each year operating the cattle grazing program. The PRIA
formula has prevented the BLM and FS from charging reasonable permit
fees, and as a result, inflation-adjusted receipts they have collected from
the fees have steadily declined for decades. In 2002, the agencies
collected $27.6 million dollars in permit fees adjusted for 2014 dollar
value.166 In 2014, the agencies collected only $18.5 million.167 If the
agencies had charged the private market rate for non-irrigated land from
2002-2012, they would have collected $261 million annually.168 Instead,
by charging a ridiculously low fee, the most the two agencies collected
combined in any year over that same period was less than $28 million. 169
As explained above, only about a quarter of that money is returned to the
Federal Treasury, and the rest is directed to land rehabilitation and local
governments.
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See id.
Id. at 28.
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Id.
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Id.
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Id.
165 See U.S. GOV T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 113, at 49-50.
166
GLASER, supra note 36, at 15.
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It is very costly to the federal government, and thus the U.S.
taxpayer, to run these federal grazing programs. Congress appropriates
tens of millions of dollars each year in excess of the money collected
through fees, to both agencies in order to operate these programs.170 In
2014, the direct grazing appropriation (which includes RBF funds and
the general management program) for the FS was $58,356,000 and for
the BLM was $85,280,000, a total of $143.6 million.171 The agencies
collected $18.5 million in fees, so receipts amounted to only 13% of the
appropriations.172 From 2002-2014, the highest percent of receipts to
appropriations was 18% and the lowest was 9%.173
The PRIA formula-created deficit means the federal subsidy to the
BLM and the FS for livestock grazing programs has been over $120
million annually for the years 2002-2014.174 To be clear, this loss is
attributable to a decline in grazing fees, not in the number of grazing
cattle, which has been stable over the time period.175 To cover the cost of
direct appropriations to the BLM and FS programs in 2012, the permit
fee would have needed to be $10.25, but the actual fee charged was
$1.35.176 These numbers are based on direct costs of the specific grazing
permit programs only. In addition, other government agencies carry out
34 related programs that benefit the permit holders directly or remediate
damage from their operations.177 Examples are federal programs to kill
native predators and remove federally protected horses during times of
drought.178
Federal cattle grazing is so extensively subsidized by the government
that one can see why livestock ranching on public lands is often referred
to as welfare ranching. 179 Each permit-holding rancher has received an
170

See id. at 16.
Id.
172
Id. at 17.
173
Id.
174
Id.
175 In fact, both agencies saw slight increases in the amount of grazing from the years
2002-2016. BLM saw a 5.2% increase in AUMs, and FS has a 1.1% increase in the
amount of AUMs grazing over that time. CAROLE HARDY VINCENT, CONG. RSCH. SERV.,
R44932, STATISTICS ON LIVESTOCK GRAZING ON FEDERAL LANDS: FY2002 TO FY2016,
(2017) at 8.
176
GLASER, supra note 36, at 19.
177
Vickery Eckhoff, The Real Price and Consequences of Livestock Grazing on
America P blic Land , Western Watershed Project (Feb. 12, 2015),
https://www.westernwatersheds.org/sustainable-cowboys-welfare-ranchers-americanwest/.
178 Id.
179
Robert H. Smith, Livestock Production: The Unsustainable Environmental and
Economic Effects of an Industry Out of Control, 4 BUFF. ENV T L.J. 45, 73.
171
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annual subsidy of about $24,000, all so that they can pay less to graze a
cow for a month than one might pay for a single canned meal for their
pet.180 It is no wonder that this minority of ranchers is so loud in their
opposition to innovations in the system.
C.

A Few Ranchers Benefit, We All Pay

The current regulatory scheme is not only illogically based on a
strict, number-driven calculus, but it is inequitable to ranchers writ large
and the American public. The notion of a Western cattle rancher is
romantic, but it is a fallacy. Most public land is grazed by only a few
permit holders. Of all federal grazing land, 50% is controlled by less than
5% of the nation s ranchers, leaving onl the remaining half of the land
to potentially be occupied by the traditional notion of a Western cattle
rancher.181 But it is not. One study concluded that half of permit holders
are hobby ranchers that are not dependent on their ranching income and
may be using it primarily as a tax write-off.182 Moreover, many permit
holders are not small-town ranchers, but Fortune 500 companies and
billionaires.183 Examples of such permit holders are Texaco, AnheuserBusch, John Hancock, and Bill Hewlett and David Packard (of HewlettPackard).184 The idea of a ranch that has been passed down through the
family for generations is also a delusion; most permit holders have not
been in business for more than a generation.185
Even if the romanticized version of Western ranching were reality,
the cost of subsidized federal grazing would outweigh the social benefit.
As other industries become obsolete through modernization, it is
doubtful that a majority of Americans will desire to spend millions of
taxpayer dollars to prop up an ineffective system that destroys the
unique, beautiful land they indirectly own. Generally, the actions we
permit to destroy the environment are profitable or beyond government
regulation. For example, the federal government has permitted oil
exploration and drilling on its property to the detriment of the lands, but
180

Eckhoff, supra note 177.
Smith, supra note 179, at 80; see also Smith, supra note 179 ( 1992 report b the
General Accounting Office, a research arm of Congress, found that 16 percent of BLM
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182
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[t]he amount of annual revenue that Federal mineral development
provides to the U.S. Treasury is second only to that provided by the
Internal Revenue Service. 186 Federal cattle grazing is neither
unregulatable nor profitable.187 Cattle ranching in the West is not
fundamentally dishonorable, but given the damage it does to the
environment, grazing on public lands at an additional cost to the taxpayer
is wrong.
IV.

A MARKET BASED SYSTEM WITH A RAISED FLOOR
A.

Prior Proposals

It has been recognized for decades that the system is broken.
Attempts at improvements have been made in the past. During the 104th
Congress (1995-96), a bill was passed by the Senate that would have
changed the permit fee.188 The formula proposed under that bill would
have removed operating costs and private permit rates from the equation
and instead only considered the gross value of the production of beef.189
It would have increased the fee by about $0.50 per AUM. Unfortunately,
it did not become law.190 In the following Congress (1997-98), the House
of Representatives passed a similar bill to change the formula to be based
on a twelve-year average of beef production costs and revenues.191 It also
failed to become law. Since the 105th Congress, there has not been a bill
passed in either chamber affecting the PRIA formula fee.192
Recent presidential administrations have taken up efforts to change
the fee and permit system without success. The Clinton Administration
proposed a change that would have increased the base fee to $3.96 per
AUM and adjusted the rate based on annual FVI changes.193 The
amendment to the law was included in an Interior Department spending
bill which was met b a fierce western Republican filibuster. 194
186

About Oil and Gas, U.S. DEP T. OF THE INTERIOR, BUREAU OF LAND M GMT.,
https://www.blm.gov/programs/energy-and-minerals/oil-and-gas/about (last visited May
11, 2021).
187 Even completely ending the public land grazing permit system would only result in
elimination of less than 20,000 low-wage jobs. See Western Grazing, supra note 182, at
728.
188
GRAZING FEES, supra note 93, at 6.
189
Id.
190 Id.
191
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192 Id.
193
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194 Frank, supra note 94, at 1286.
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Although the Administration did eventually get a federal land grazing
bill passed into law, congressional objections prevented an increase to
permit fees.195 The subsequent Bush Administration proposed ending the
depositing of 50% of BLM receipts into the RBF, and instead depositing
them in the General Fund of the U.S. Treasury.196 This would not have
changed the fee charged but would have decreased the losses of
operating the program. It also did not become law.
The most recent attempt at fee change occurred in the Obama
Administration. The Interior Secretary Sally Jewell proposed the addition
of an administrative fee per AUM that would be phased in to reach a
$2.50 fee per AUM in 2017.197 Given the 8,820,617 AUMs authorized
that year, this fee would have generated over $22 million more in
receipts for the BLM alone. Though receipts would not have reached
anywhere near the cost of operating the program, this change would have
increased revenue from grazers by 148%.198 Because the administrative
fee is separate from the AUM permit fee, it would not have violated the
statutory restriction that the permit fee cannot increase more than 25%
annually.199 The proposal faced harsh opposition from the cattle industry
and never became law.200
The Trump Administration s changes were not fee-based but instead
focused on fle ibilit for ranchers.201 A 2017 agenc initiative s goal
was to improve BLM s management of gra ing on public lands b
offering livestock operators greater flexibility to more readily respond to
changing on-the-ground conditions, such as drought or wildfire. 202 The
BLM currently has changes to administrative provisions pending that
would overhaul gra ing regulations for public lands. 203 The changes
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mostly addresses NEPA and the permitting process, and do not change
the fee formula.204
The Biden Administration has promised to make addressing climate
change a central focus of federal policy.205 As evidenced by Executive
Order 14009, issued days into the new presidency, the climate plan will
include changes to the management of federal lands.206 It appears likely
the Biden Administration will renew the efforts of the Obama
Administration to create a more equitable federal cattle grazing program.
B.

Improved Solution and the B.E.E.F.

Cattle production on public lands is contributing to the warming of
the environment and the federal government is not only allowing it, but
subsidizing it. Mandating even a small decrease in the number of cattle
raised on public lands would be highly controversial and is unlikely to
have a significant impact on decreasing global GHG emissions. Instead,
if the government collects receipts for grazing comparable to those
charged on state and private lands, it could decrease the inequitable
subsidy, as well as redistribute money to mitigate the GHG impact of
cattle on public lands.
The PRIA fee is the reason the BLM and FS federal cattle grazing
programs run at huge deficits. But America is not committed to this
future, and the federal grazing fee should be brought in line with the
principles it was created under and operate similar to typical lessors.
Modernizing the permit fee can be accomplished by a two-fold change.
First, the minimum rate has to be raised to make certain the government
receives a fairer price. Second, the permits should then be auctioned to
the public for a price in excess of the minimum rate, and the permit
length should be altered to allow more frequent fee adjustment through
auctions. Additionally, the increased revenue resulting from these
changes should be allocated to efforts to mitigate cattle production s
effect on climate change.

204

See Notice of Intent to Prepare an Environmental Impact Statement for the Proposed
Revision of Grazing Regulations for Public Lands, 85 Fed. Reg. 3410 (Jan. 21, 2020).
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1. Minimum fee as a floor
There is no one correct way to determine the minimum fee. It can be
determined by: (1) a flat rate (increasing with inflation); (2) a formula
similar to PRIA; or (3) adding an administrative fee onto the current rate
(as proposed by the Obama Administration). The flat fee could take the
cost back to its origins by being set at one-third the cost of the average
private rates in the year it is adopted. It should change annually to
account for inflation. This plan would have resulted in a $6.69 fee for
2012.207 But over time, this method runs into the problem that the
number may no longer be close to the future market difference of private
and public lands. It also puts the fee above the market rate for some
federal lands that have little grazing value.
A simple formula based on principles similar to the flat fee could be
more responsive to the market. Just removing BCPI and PPI from the
PRIA formula would make the calculation much more in line with
private markets because PVI serves that purpose alone.208 But the 1.23
multiplier in PRIA no longer has any factual basis. Since it was based on
market conditions in the 1960 s, there is no reason to keep it. Instead, a
formula based purely on FVI is the simplest way to have the floor rate
track the market.
The third way, the proposal by the Obama Administration, is to keep
the PRIA formula and add an administrative cost onto the permit fee.
This solution is simple and could be done without passing a law through
Congress. It is debatable what the additional fee should be, but
something similar to the Obama plan in the $3.00 range could be
palatable to ranchers. This may require frequent changes to track the
market and could be removed by any subsequent administration.
When looking at the cost per AUM now, a proposal to increase the
fee up to six times the current rate (proposal 1) may seem extreme. In
reality, other federal agencies and state agencies have charged, and
continue to charge, rates in excess of $10 per AUM.209 And when
compared to private grazing rates, the new floor fee is still minuscule. As
explained above, around a $7.00 AUM fee still only serves the purpose
of bringing the fee to 1/3 the private fee, which was considered equitable
in the past.
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2. Market-based mechanisms as a ceiling
The real innovation in this plan comes with the return to market
based principles.210 As described in Section IV-A, the quality of the land
and resulting permit value varies widely state to state and even within a
state. Instead of mandating a set permit price, markets should govern the
price in excess of the floor rate. First of all, permits will not be issued for
ten-year periods. To keep the markets active and competitive, the permit
length should be shortened to six years. The next item to change is the
automatic renewal preference for permit holders. The agency must
instead put the permit rights up for a competitive auction at renewal time.
This is an approach the federal government applies to allocation of
multiple types of permits. For example, the federal government auctions
both sulfur pollution allowances211 and wireless spectrum licenses212 in a
competitive, public bidding process.
The agency will physically post information about an upcoming
auction of the permit in relevant places, as well as in an online
marketplace that they create. This will take place about one year prior to
the renewal date in order to give time for multiple bids, as well as time
for people to enter the market if they need to purchase property in the
area as usually required by the agencies. This could have the additional
positive impact of increasing land value in areas with highly sought-after
grazing land. The auction will not be blind because knowledge of
competing bids would increase transparency and increase fairness. At the
end of the bidding period, the current permit holder will be given the
option to outbid the current highest bid. It will benefit all parties to leave
in place some preference for the permit holder and continuity, without
automatically allowing them the permit at next-to-nothing. If a rancher
over-extends themselves with their bid and goes bankrupt during their
permit term, the permit will go back up for auction.
The market-based approach allows the agency to charge a fair fee for
the land. We know this system can work because it has already worked
with other federal and state agencies.213 Even the FS already uses
market-based methods for determining fees in the eastern national forest
210
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211
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lands. 214 The federal government should not be leasing public land at
the same rate in California as it does in Arizona, when privately-leased
lands average permit rates are for $19.50/AUM in California and
$9.00/AUM in Arizona. A fee determined by the market considers
regional variations in the quality of federal land. It also allows variation
from adjacent properties. If one permit allocation has extensive natural
water access and the neighboring property does not, it is equitable for the
former to pay a higher rate.
3. Allocation of revenue to climate mitigation
The purpose of the increased base fee is to decrease the financial loss
at which the program is operating. Moreover, the market-based auction
serves an additional purpose: the B.E.E.F. Every cent charged in excess
of the base permit rate should be collected and deposited into a fund that
serves to mitigate the impact of cattle production on climate change. The
Bettering Environments and Economies Fund (B.E.E.F.) will be separate
from the RBF and serve a different purpose. The RBF assists in
rehabilitating grazed lands; this will likely have some positive
environmental impact, but the B.E.E.F. will have the specific purpose of
mitigating GHG emissions. The B.E.E.F. will be used as those operating
the fund see fit, whether that be partnerships with the private sector to
reduce emissions215 or creating carbon sinks.216 Instead of keeping the
fund within the agency collecting the receipts and having two funds
operated by agencies with other primary focuses (BLM and FS), the
money could be redistributed to a new Division in the EPA with the
relevant expertise and connections to the proper private entities to do the
work.
The PRIA fee is only currently in effect through an executive order,
so any administration could raise the base permit fee. But to accomplish
the auction system, there would have to be congressional changes to the
statutes controlling the BLM and FS. As climate change becomes a top
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issue for many voters217 and politicians, changes such as this may receive
broader support than attempts at change in past decades.
These proposed improvements taken together greatly improve the
challenging political position the government is in. No rancher is being
forced to shut down; if ranchers run a profitable operation and are willing
to pay as much as their neighbor for their permits, then they can ranch as
long as they want. The raised floor could substantially decrease the
amount the U.S. taxpayer is subsidizing cattle grazing on land they
indirectly own. And the B.E.E.F. can help address the negative climate
externalities of cattle production.
V.

ADDRESSING POTENTIAL ISSUES

The primary argument for keeping the permit fee at such a low value
compared to private rates is that the private leases provide higher quality
land and amenities so that it is, in fact, equivalent to federal lease prices.
But, there is no general agreement about the comparabilit of private
and public land forage. 218 Advantages of private lands may include the
ability to sublease, watering, fencing, and other services provided by the
land owner.219 Still, it seems highly unlikely that private forage and
services are regularly 20 times more valuable than the public land forage.
This paper is not advocating that they charge the same rate per AUM,
just that they better reflect their market value. If the public land forage
was agreed to be worth 1/3 of private forage fifty years ago, how can it
be on average worth less than 1/10 the value now? Because no one
knows with certainty the comparative value of land across the board, it is
logical to allow the market to decide. Cattle ranching in the West must be
able to turn a profit at a higher permit cost than the current permit rate, or
the private leases on those adjacent lands would not exist.
In the past, federal agencies have argued that an auction system
would be disruptive to the permittee and community stability. 220 That is
not necessarily true and should not be the primary concern. Studies have
shown that the loss of a federal grazing permit would not result in most
ranchers selling their lands; they would instead usually try to adjust their
operations.221 Moreover, allowing the current permit holder the
217

Alec Tyson, How Important is Climate change to Voters in the 2020 Election?, PEW
RESEARCH CTR. (Oct. 6, 2020), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2020/10/06/howimportant-is-climate-change-to-voters-in-the-2020-election/.
218
TORELL ET AL., supra note 130, at 5.
219 GRAZING FEES, supra note 93, at 9.
220
TORELL ET AL., supra note 130, at 5.
221 Western Grazing, supra note 182, at 729.
375
https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wjelp/vol11/iss3/7

28

Janicek: Climate Change Has Beef with Federal Cattle Grazing

Washington Journal of Environmental Law and Policy

opportunity to match the highest bid will decrease disruption and allow
continuity. The only ranchers potentially displaced would be those that
cannot run their cattle operation as efficiently as other ranchers that
could afford to outbid them. Western cattle ranching should be subject to
the same market forces as every other industry. Even if some individuals
are unfortunately priced out of the market, it is not clear that this would
result in a net decrease in AUMs grazing.222 Where ranchers were
surviving on government-subsidized permits, their operations were not
economically sound. Much of the West is not fit for raising cattle, and
there are insufficient economic or virtuous reasons to force it to be used
as such.223 The disruption of Western ranching life is a negative
externality of climate change, but hopefully other laws aimed at climate
change will provide funding to reeducate, retool, or relocate those that
cannot afford their permits.
The agencies have also posited that the scattered and isolated nature
of some lands makes it unlikely there will be a competitive bidding
system.224 This issue is resolved by keeping a permit rate floor instead of
using a pure auction, because even if only one rancher wants the land, it
will lease for a higher and more reasonable rate than it currently is. Even
if the auction might fail for some properties, that does not mean it will
not often succeed.225 Relatedly, some may argue bidding will not actually
be open to an entire market of people, but only a handful of neighbors
because of agency requirements that permit holders have adjacent land to
the permitted land to serve as a base property. This may be the case, and
it is acceptable if the auction does not always have a plethora of
bidders.226 But times when a permit is being auctioned at a price
significantly below its market value may result in entrepreneurial
ranchers purchasing a base property to get access to the permit
opportunit . Accordingl , a piece of propert s pro imit or access to
federally permitted land should increase property values.227
Others may argue an auction system along with the permit length
decrease puts more strain on the agencies administrations which are
already backlogged.228 Normally that may be correct, but there is a fix for
222
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that as well. The removal of NEPA requirements for federal grazing
permits would greatly speed up the review process.229 NEPA serves to
force consideration of the impact of government actions on the global
climate. If the B.E.E.F. is serving to mitigate the emission of GHG of
cattle grazing on federal lands while the RBF and other programs address
other environmental impacts, there are few net negative environmental
harms to be considered.230 Cattle production would still harm the lands
and water systems, but the RBF fund already serves to remedy those
impacts. As a result, and to appease ranchers, permit applicants should
no longer be required to complete NEPA Environmental Assessment.231
There are other examples of certain government actions being exempted
from NEPA review,232 so this is not a revolutionary concept. In fact, the
Department of Energy Office of Environment, Health, Safety and
Security recently published a document listing NEPA categorical
exclusions for 79 government agencies.233 For example, the BLM has a
categorical e clusion for the [i]ssuance of future interest leases under
the Mineral Leasing Act for Acquired Lands where the subject lands are
alread in production. 234 Though the exact impact of B.E.E.F. is unclear
and mitigation is not an exact 1:1 science, providing a categorical NEPA
exclusion in exchange for implementation of the B.E.E.F. system is a
fairly equitable trade. Even though ranchers would welcome the NEPA
exclusion, it is probable they will argue this is not sufficient
compensation for increased permit cost. As a result, enacting such a
change in the law would be challenging because the food animal industry
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is one of the largest monetary contributors to federal political candidates
and has a powerful lobbying influence.235
One might point out that cattle ranching on Western federal lands
only accounts for about 3% of American s cattle production, so the
impact of the improvements from the B.E.E.F. system may not alter the
course of global warming.236 That may be true, but the change is still
important due to the unique qualities of the problem. Because this
ranching is taking place on land owned by U.S. citizens, while being
subsidized by U.S. taxpayers, ranchers should be accountable for the
destruction of the globe even if its impact is limited. The B.E.E.F. system
is a compromise to others that have argued that grazing on Western
federal lands should end all together.237
It must be acknowledged that the subsidies to cattle production
largely benefit the American consumer by lowering the cost of beef they
purchase. But as explained above, the cattle produced on federal lands
makes up a small portion of American consumption and therefore is not
likely to alter the beef market if it becomes slightly more expensive to
produce. The subsidies that generally make beef significantly less
expensive are the subsidies to the farms that produce feed for cattle
which is then sold to ranchers at low prices.238 Slightly raising production
prices for federal land permit holders would have no impact on the cost
of producing cattle through feed lots.
Finally, it would be naive to think these logical improvements, that
would garner popular public support, would not be controversial. If the
failures of multiple Congresses and Administrations to address the issue
are not sufficient proof, the Cliven Bundy saga is demonstrative. Cliven
Bundy grazed federal lands for decades without a permit, arguing that the
land belonged to Nevada, and that his ancestors used the land before the
federal government claimed it.239 In 2014, after the BLM exhausted all
administrative solutions, federal agents attempted to seize his cattle.240
They were met by a militia of hundreds of armed protestors and the
agents were forced to give up on their attempts when the situation was
235
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close to violence.241 Criminal charges from this episode are still being
litigated.242 This story illustrates that there will be vocal opposition to
permit fee increases, but it does not represent the majority of ranchers
nor does it represent what is best for the globe.
CONCLUSION
The BLM and the FS programs that regulate federal cattle grazing in
the Western United States are broken and inequitable. Operating under a
misguided permit fee formula created nearly five decades ago, the
agencies lose tens of millions of dollars annually running their grazing
programs. All the while, cattle are damaging the land and waterways of
the West that belong to the American people. Moreover, the cattle are
releasing significant quantities of potent GHGs, increasing the rate by
which the Earth is warming which will only further complicate cattle
production and human life.
Americans need not be resolute to this bleak future. As the battle
against climate change rages on and potentially turns the corner toward
more collective action, cattle production will have its time under the
microscope.243 The B.E.E.F. system is an increase in the floor permit
rate, coupled with a return to market-based fee principles by auctioning
the permit rights. This is a straightforward change and compromise that
will decrease government subsidies and mitigate GHG emissions, while
allowing ranchers to utilize the land for a fraction of the cost of private
permits
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